“as long as Jews exist there always will be financial problems...........every fifty years, mark my words.”
以上是我在豆瓣看到的一句评论,如惊雷般击醒了我。特别制作这个列表:
Inside.Job.监守自盗中关键"罪犯" 宗教背景一览.
资料全部来自维基百科.后面数字是他们在职期间收入.名单只收录到电影一半的时候.
Donald Regan United States Secretary of the Treasury Irish Catholic
Charles Keating banker *Catholic
Alan Greenspan Chairman of the Federal Reserve Jew
Robert Rubin United States Secretary of the Treasury Jew 12600,0000
Lawrence Summers Director of the White House National Economic Council for Obama jew 2000,0000
Franklin Raines ceo of Fannie Mae black 5200,0000
Arthur Levitt SEC Chairman jew
Phil" Gramm economist and politician vice-chairman of ubs
Richard Severin "Dick" Fuld ceo of Lehman Brothers jew 48500,0000 7架飞机和一架直升机
Henry Merritt "Hank" Paulson United States Treasury Secretary/ceo of Goldman Sachs Christian 48500,0000
ben bernanke jew
tim geithner half German half WASP
Lloyd Blankfein ceo Goldman Sachs jew
John Paulson founder and president of Paulson & Co. jew
加一个:
George Soros Jew 亚洲金融危机制造者
The economist’s reply to the “Inside Job”
October 8, 2010 4:13 pm by FT 14
By Prof Frederic Mishkin
“You ought to be in pictures” is something no one has ever said to me. And as one of a number of economists making uncomfortable cameo appearances in the new Hollywood documentary, “Inside Job,” I now know why.
In July 2009, I agreed to be interviewed on camera for a film that was presented to me as a thoughtful examination of the factors leading up to the 2008 global economic collapse. About five minutes after the microphone was clipped to my lapel, however, it became clear that my role in the film was predetermined – and I would not be wearing a white hat.
Rather than examining the facts of the financial crisis, the filmmaker focused on a study I co-authored that was commissioned and published by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce in May 2006. The report, which I welcome people to read, examined a variety of risks to Iceland’s financial stability about 28 months before its financial crisis hit.
It would be great to be able to say that I predicted the collapse of Iceland’s economy more than two years before it happened, but I didn’t. However, my co-author and I did correctly identify several risks to Iceland, including rapid credit growth, a lack of transparency in the banking system, and the possibility that banks could experience refinancing problems. And many of the excesses of the Icelandic banks that led to their collapse had yet to emerge at the time the report was written. For example:
• The Icelandic banking system was only 40% of the size it reached just before its collapse in October 2008.
• Deposit accounts abroad such as the Icesave accounts (particularly in the U.K. and Holland), which have led to demands for large sums of repayment from foreign government after the crisis, did not yet exist, and were first issued in Autumn of 2006 in the U.K. and summer of 2008 in Holland.
• The investment grade of the Icelandic banks was excellent at the time of publication of the report. In 2007 their investment grades were raised even further. The banks were not downgraded until the summer of 2008.
• Mortgage and other loans denominated in foreign currencies were not prevalent until later.
I would have been pleased to discuss these later developments in Iceland’s economy in more detail with the filmmaker – had he given me a chance. We might have also discussed why the financial crisis occurred, and why policymakers and the economics profession (myself included) did not fully recognize the inadequacies of prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system in advanced economies. Instead, the filmmaker made insinuations that I didn’t disclose that I was compensated for the study – even though he learned the precise amount of the fee in a 2006 from a public disclosure that I made. Even odder, a big deal was made of an inconsistency in my curriculum vita, where the title of the Iceland study first appeared in 2006 with the phrase “Financial Instability” and later as “Financial Stability” (the accurate language). I had discovered and corrected this typo long before the interview.
Hopefully, interviews like the one I experienced will not dissuade economists and academics from participating in the important public discourse needed to better understand what went wrong during this crisis, and how to bolster prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system to make severe worldwide financial crises less likely.
Academic economists (myself included) did get some things right in the run up to the crisis. Many of us identified Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as accidents waiting to happen long before they saddled American taxpayers with losses that are now estimated to total between $400bn and $1,000bn. Of course, we in the economics profession need to recognize where our theories and empirical research proved inadequate, and then revise them to provide better analysis to guide economic policy in the future.
This is the sort of work that I’ll be focusing on for now. It’s all too clear I have no future on the silver screen.
Frederic S. Mishkin is a professor of finance and economics at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. From September 2006 to August 2008 he was a member (governor) of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2010/10/the-economists-reply-to-the-inside-job/-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Obviously, he was paid
也不知道从什么时候起开始对纪录片有点兴趣,虽然涉猎不多,但我想好的纪录片应当像一篇规整的文章一样思路清晰条理清楚。自然科学方面,BBC的片子就如同说明文范文,行云流水一气呵成;社会科学的话,本片绝对可以作为议论文范文入选教材。理由如下:
首先,论点清晰,干脆直接。甫一开始就提出deregulation的祸根说,从冰岛引述开始直到最后很主流的落点到自由女神像,不偏题不跑题,中心思想贯穿始终。
其次,论据翔实,旁征博引。片中众多政经界重量级人物的第一手采访资料相当给力,再加上丰富的史料陈述和数据统计,特别是那些陈年旧月的报纸、税单全部翻出来,相当的考据范儿。
最后,论证充分,有理有据。全片以采访加旁白的基调为主,摆事实讲道理,五个部分结构缜密逻辑分明,来龙去脉分析的头头是道,配以统计图表,彰显严谨的学术范儿。
所以在奥斯卡学院派的评委眼中,本片绝对是SCI优秀论文一枚,获奖在所难免。而对于普通观众来说,这论文虽然严肃却不枯燥,这要归功于出色的配乐和剪辑,引片结束后的那首big time和片尾曲congratulations都很赞。另外,在波澜不惊的叙述之外片中还偶尔穿插一些良心拷问式的撩拨,以淡定的画外音应对急了眼的受访者,那些不肯接受采访的字幕打出来更是无声胜有声,一招连消带打直击要害,迅速占领道德高地,观众看得义愤填膺,达到不证自明的论证最高境界。于是我也能充分理解那位给盗版碟做翻译的老兄,一定是看得怒发冲冠,忘了仔细听采访中说的各种数据,急于向广大祖国群众揭露华尔街的贪婪无耻,不自觉下笔就如水银泻地,愤怒之情跃然纸上,对白大意离题万里。。
PS:片中那个Andrew Sheng说:“A real engineer builds bridges,a financial engineer builds dreams”,当时憋了一眼他的title是中国银监会首席顾问,心想我党还有这等人才,接受这样的采访还能说出这么有才的话?回头百度了下,原来是香港证监会原主席,马来西亚人。。
真一般~会讲英文那中国妞哪找来的~
一个悲剧的结束就是另一个悲剧的开始,美国金融决策层和体制依旧是换汤不换药,影片创作者思路清新,一众金融界高层学者经济学家教授作家轮番登场,让我们看到了金融海啸背后的复杂原因。影片最后那些还值得我们去奋斗的未免有点艰难,又一轮悲剧重新整装代发!★★★★★
根本是编导的一家之言,只为了支持自己的观点,而把反对立场的人通通归类为傻瓜,这种纪录片究竟有什么价值?因为批判主流、批判权贵、批判政府,就是一部好作品?什么时候价值观已经被扭曲成这样了?
并没有大家评的那么好看。。。游戏在那里,玩或者不玩而已。。。要么远离地球文明。。。。
hedge了个fund的!
观点明确,逻辑清晰,论据丰富,论证紧凑,虽不够全面,但在关键问题上一矢中的,简洁明了。
虽然之前也了解过金融危机,但是从这电影,我了解了什么是金融界
以为马特达蒙转型了。。。结果悲剧的发现丫儿只是旁白。。。被骗。。。但此片颇具教育意义,它充分揭露了资本主义贪婪的本性,再一次证明了伟大的社会主义才能救中国!建议将此片收入马克思主义政治经济学教材,以供大家引以为戒!
片中有一句:美国人能不能上大学的一个主要因素取决于他们将能不能付得起学费!!!!!!!!美国的“官官相护”其实不亚于中国,甚至奥巴马政府都默许了上届政府的作为。导演悲观的认为现有局面很难改善或者以后还会有问题,因为奥巴马政府用的依然是危机之前订立“不良”制度的那些专家。
小布什、奥巴马、保尔森、伯南克、索罗斯……悉数登场。看完本片的第一感觉就是,马克思又要胜利了。另外,少给一星的原因是:本片少拍了五百分钟。
一部预设立场的秋后算账意味的檄文。可以看作是控方陈词,因为基本上辩方没有发言的权力。投行们不是有钱吗,把请说客的钱匀一些出来,拍一部「我本善良」作为辩方陈词吧。
对经济以及金融危机感兴趣的不要错过。制作十分宏大,从冰岛全国经济沦陷,引及世界级金融巨头,数据细致繁多,条理逻辑却很清晰,条分缕析,针砭时弊,把美国和世界上某些监守自盗的金融家讽刺得体无完肤。可即便如此,这正是金融家们的一贯嘴脸和惯用手段,发家致富的必经之路。马特.达蒙全程配音。
这才叫纪录片,这其中的观点不一定都对,却代表了这个社会的反思精神和反思能力。
这是一个thriller,拥有史上最泯灭人性的villains,并且他们无一受到些许惩罚。看好后心中充满百倍于[buried]的愤怒恐惧和绝望,没有任何一部电影如此有力得证明了"金钱太强大人性本恶而世界是没有希望的"凄惨事实。你无法想像我有多希望这片子是纯属虚构。
觉得特别讽刺。纪录片里accuse的那些人,都是我们在现实生活中想成为的人,想去的公司,想赚的那份钱。
什麽恐怖片驚悚片,都不如這個最真實的世界嚇人。哪裡都一樣,權利掌握在最少數的人手裡。影院裡一直有人鼓掌叫好的片子已經不多了,感謝lincoln plaza一直在公映這部片...一定要跟著字幕再看一次 有些沒有聽懂 暫且四星。
怪不得美国网民纳闷:中国能毙了自己的贪官和奸商,美国却花钱救了他们并让他们重整旗鼓。
思路很清晰,采访对象很牛逼,配乐做得很不错!
在我看,纪录片主要分两种,一种是记录一件事情或一个人。另一种则是把现有的记录片段重新排列组合,并配合人物访谈和讲解,进而证明自己的观点。更像是一篇议论文,本片显然是后者,条理清晰、论据充分,结论有力,就赢了。
世界末日根本不需要自然灾害,有华尔街那群吸血鬼就足够了。“华尔街政治”这个观点真是一针见血,观海兄,你也洗洗睡吧,要么也下海好了。欧洲国家的那些政府真比美国政府有诚意多了。以及,比起金融界的那些学术枪手,影评界的枪手都弱成渣渣了。